



[This is a penultimate draft of a paper that is forthcoming in a volume edited by David Kaspar.] 
 
Realism, Objectivity and Evaluation 
I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, 
metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it.  I explain why normative 
pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this explanation to formulate a radicalization of 
Moore's Open Question Argument.  According to the argument, the facts -- even the normative 
facts -- fail to settle the practical questions at the center of our normative lives.  One lesson is 
that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension. 
 
Benacerraf’s Challenge 
In his [1973] Benacerraf articulated an epistemological challenge for mathematical realism -- 
roughly, the view that there are (non-vacuous) mind-independent mathematical facts.  The 
challenge can be interpreted in different ways.  But it is widely agreed that the most pressing 
challenge in the vicinity is to explain the ​reliability ​of our mathematical beliefs.  Field writes, 
 
The way to understand Benacerraf’s challenge…is...as a challenge to…​explain the 
reliability​ of [our mathematical] beliefs.  We start out by assuming the existence of 
mathematical entities that obey the standard mathematical theories; we grant also that 
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there may be positive reasons for believing in those entities…..But Benacerraf’s 
challenge…is to…explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well reflect 
the facts about them​…[I]f it appears in principle impossible to explain this​, then that 
tends to ​undermine​ the belief in mathematical entities, ​despite​ whatever reason we might 
have for believing in them.” [1989: 26, italics in original] 
 
Note that Field’s interpretation of Benacerraf’s challenge is not a “convince the skeptic” 
challenge.  Field allows the realist to assume both the (actual) truth and (defeasible) justification 
of her mathematical beliefs when explaining their reliability.  If he did not allow this, then his 
challenge would overgeneralize.  Consider the evolutionary and psychophysical explanations of 
the reliability of our observational beliefs.  These would do nothing to convince someone who 
was worried that we were brains in vats.  The evidence for them is observational.  But these 
explanations still seem to afford our observational beliefs a kind of intellectual security.  The 
challenge pressed by Field is to show that our mathematical beliefs can be secured similarly. 
 
The Pluralist Solution 
The challenge to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, assuming mathematical 
realism, can appear insuperable.  There do not seem to be any causal or other physical relations 
between us and mathematical reality which might illuminate the correlation between our beliefs 
and the truths.  But there is a version of realism -- what I will call mathematical ​pluralism ​-- that 
even Field concedes affords an answer to the challenge (Field 2005, 78).  Pluralism says that 
there are a rich plurality of mathematical concepts, and all of them are independently satisfied.  
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 Such a view is largely uncontroversial for areas like (pure) geometry.  Even realists concede that 
a plurality of geometrical concepts -- e.g., Euclidean and hyperbolic concepts -- are 
independently satisfied.  They are simply satisfied by different subjects.  What makes 
mathematical pluralism radical is its generalization of this point to foundational areas, like set 
theory.  Insofar as set theory constitutes the ultimate court of appeal for mathematical questions, 
mathematical pluralism says that there can fail to be a unique answers to those questions. 
Consider, for instance, the question of whether every vector space has a basis (which is 
equivalent in ZF to the question of whether the Axiom of Choice is true).  The pluralist says that 
this question is analogous to the question of whether two lines making less than a 180​° ​angle 
with another must intersect -- i.e., to that of whether the Parallel Postulate is true.  In some 
universes, the answer is “yes”.  But in others, it is “no”.  There is no deeper answer.  And while 
we could always ask which universe ​we ​happen to be talking about (or what is packed into the 
concepts we happen to have), this question is of no mathematical interest.  It puts no constraints 
on what mathematical entities there are.  So, while mathematical pluralism is a realist view, since 
it allows that there are independent mathematical facts, there is a palpable sense in which it gives 
up on the ​objectivity ​of mathematics.  It says that in a debate over axioms, neither party need be 
wrong.  While the pluralist denies that we can generate truths by making stipulations, she agrees 
with the conventionalist that “the conflict between divergent points of view… disappears… 
[B]efore us lies the boundless ocean of unlimited possibilities” (Carnap 1937/2001, XV).  1
1 ​The word “objective” can mean a dizzying variety of things, including mind-and-language independent, 
intersubjective, or having objects.  Again, I do not mean to suggest that pluralism is anti-objectivist in any of these 
senses.  It is anti-objectivist in roughly the sense that the theory of relativity is anti-objectivist about simultaneity. 
There is an independent fact about what is simultaneous with what relative to a given reference frame, R.  But there 
are myriad reference frames, and one gets different answers to the simultaneity question by plugging them in for R. 
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 How do pluralists solve the Benacerraf problem?  They do so “by articulating views on which 
though mathematical objects are mind-independent, any view we had had of them would have 
been correct” (Field 2005, 78).  As Beall puts it, “[i]f you’re having trouble hitting the target, 
then just make your target bigger” (Beall 1999, 323)!  Strictly speaking, the pluralist can only 
secure this result if she supplements her plentiful metaphysics with a cooperative metasemantics 
(Clarke-Doane, Forthcoming A, Sec. 2).  It must be added that had we accepted different 
mathematical sentences, then we would have ​changed the subject​.  If the Axiom of Choice, 
semantically individuated, is true “in” one mathematical universe, then it is not false in another. 
But it could be that along with sets, there are shmets.  Shmets, we might say, are like sets except 
that they fail to satisfy Choice.  So, neither the advocate of Choice nor the advocate of ~Choice 
needs to have false beliefs.  There is enough ​mind-independent​ mathematical truth to go around.  2
 
Metaphysical Pluralism 
Although Benacerraf’s and Field’s focus was mathematics, the challenge to explain the 
reliability of our beliefs readily arises for realism about many other areas too.  ​Stalnaker writes, 
 
2 ​The foundations of mathematical pluralism -- and, indeed, pluralism about other areas (see below) -- are more 
involved than I am letting on.  The question of how inclusive the “pluriverse” should be is vexed.  It is natural to 
hold that any (first-order) consistent theory is witnessed somewhere in it.  But, by Godel’s Second Incompleteness 
Theorem, such a position engenders pluralism about (classical) consistency itself (since this says that it is consistent 
to say false things about consistency, if weak theories of arithmetic are consistent).  And ​this ​engenders pluralism 
about pluralism!  Moreover, the pluralist must explain our knowledge of consistency, or the surrogate of consistency 
to which she appeals.  Such knowledge will be tantamount to mathematical knowledge (e.g., of a Π​1​ arithmetic 
sentence).  ​For pertinent discussion, see (Clarke-Doane Forthcoming B, Chapter 6) and (Field 1998). 
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It is a familiar objection to...modal realism that if it were true, then it would not be 
possible to know any of the facts about what is...possible….This epistemological 
objection...may...parallel...Benacerraf’s dilemma about mathematical...knowledge. 
(Stalnaker 1996, 39–40). 
 
And Schechter remarks, 
 
We are reliable about logic….This is a striking fact about us, one that stands in need of 
explanation. But it is not at all clear how to explain it….This puzzle is akin to the 
well-known Benacerraf-Field problem…(Schechter 2013, 1).  
 
How should modal, (meta)logical, and other realists address the Benacerraf problem?  Just like 
mathematical pluralists!  The modal realist should say that there are a plurality of possibility-like 
concepts, all independently satisfied, giving intuitively opposite verdicts on modal questions 
(Clarke-Doane 2019).  And the logical realist should say that same about consequence-like 
concepts (Beall and Restall 2006).   The question of whether you could have had different 3
parents, or whether anything follows from a contradiction, is like the Parallel Postulate question. 
 
In general, the realist about an area, F, for which the Benacerraf problem is pressing should be an 
F-pluralist​.  What are those areas?  ​Prima facie​, they are those areas whose truths would be 
causally inert.  These include both ontologically committed and ontologically innocent areas. 
3 By “logic” I mean the non-normative theory of what follows from what.  I will come back to normative questions 
like what we ought to infer from what below. 
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For instance, if modal operators are taken as primitive, like negation, then modal truths are not 
about ​novel entities, like worlds.  But they would still seem to be causally inert.  So, the realist 
about modality should be a modal pluralist, whether or not she believes in possible worlds.  
 
Normative Pluralism 
As a methodologically Carnapian view, pluralism is ​pragmatist​.  It says that the only non-verbal 
question in the neighborhood of typical foundational questions, like whether the Axiom of 
Choice is true, is whether we ought to use a notion of set that satisfies that axiom.  (Depending 
on how the pluralism is formulated, it will not say this about select “meta” questions, such as 
whether a theory is consistent.  See, again, fn. 1.)  Similarly, it says that the only non-verbal 
question in the neighborhood of whether Hesperus could have failed to be identical to 
Phosphorus, or whether Disjunctive Syllogism is valid, is whether we ought to assume the 
Necessity of Identity, or whether we ought to infer P from (P v Q) and ~Q.  Any other question is 
really just about us.  It is just about what language we speak, or what is “packed into” the 
concepts we happen to be using, as opposed to being about what the independent world is like.  
 
However, the question of what notions we ought to use is a ​normative ​question.  Notoriously, the 
Benacerraf problem arises for normative realism ​a fortiori​ ((Mackie (1977, 28), (Huemer 2005, 
99), (Enoch 2011)).  Should realists be a pluralist about normative questions as well? 
 
There ​are ​(realist) pluralists about normative areas, however unwitting.  That is, there are realists 
who postulate a plurality of normative-like concepts, all independently satisfied.  For example, 
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Jackson advocates a view according to which “[t]he term ‘fair’ picks out a descriptive 
property...by virtue of the place that that property occupies in folk moral theory, and in a manner 
that requires other moral terms simultaneously to pick out complementary descriptive properties” 
(Jackson and Pettit 1995, 25).  Since such descriptive properties are mind-and-language 
independent, but also plentiful, Jackson’s view is pluralist.  In a “dispute” over fairness, neither 
party need be wrong.  One party can be right of fairness​1​, and the other can be right of fairness​2​.  4
 
But there is something peculiarly unsatisfactory about normative pluralism.  Indeed, the problem 
is in the background of Horgans’ and Timmons’ “Moral Twin Earth” objection to (Jackson 1992, 
460), as well as to recent discussion of “alternative normative concepts” (Eklund 2017).   At first 5
pass: normative theory is supposed to tell us what to do.  But while we can ​believe ​whatever 
theories we like, we can only ​do ​one thing.  Knowledge that we ought​1​ kill the one to save the 
five (in some situation) but ought​2​ would leave the ​practical ​question open -- whether to. 
 
Moore’s Open Question Revisited 
4 ​Similarly, Boyd writes of his realism, that, while it is ​pluralist​ in the present sense, it “​is only in a relatively 
uninteresting sense non-realistic. The dependence of the truth of moral propositions upon moral beliefs envisioned 
[in a scenario where different properties causally regulate “good” in different communities] would be…an ordinary 
case of causal dependence and not the sort of logical dependence required by a constructivist conception of morals 
analogous to a Kuhnian neo-Kantian conception of the dependence of scientific truth on the adoption of theories or 
paradigms.  The subject matter of moral inquiry in each of the relevant communities would be theory-and- 
belief-independent in the sense relevant to the dispute between realists and social constructionists” (Boyd 1988, 
225f).  While Jackson and Boyd are “naturalists”, normative pluralists need not be (just as mathematical, modal, and 
logical pluralists need not be).  ​Scanlon, a non-naturalist, advocates a view according to which  “as long as some 
way of talking [is] well defined, internally coherent, and ​[does] not have any presuppositions or implications that 
might conflict with those of other domains​, such as science” such talk is true (Scanlon 2014, 27, emphasis in 
original). 
5 See also Enoch’s objection to Scanlon in (Enoch 2011, 121). 
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It is widely assumed that such reasoning just shows that, unlike realists about “descriptive” 
subjects, like mathematics, modality, or (non-normative) logic, normative realists must be 
non-pluralists -- or, what I will call, ​objectivists​.  This would be significant.  It would mean that 
the realism about descriptive areas is on better epistemological footing than realism about 
normative ones ((Berry 2019) and (Jonas Forthcoming)).  Unlike normative realists, descriptive 
realists can answer Benacerraf’s challenge. 
 
The problem is deeper than that, however.  The problem is that normative facts -- however sparse 
or plentiful -- fail to settle practical questions (Clarke-Doane 2015).  To see this, let us recall 
Moore’s Open Question Argument (Moore 1903, Section 13).  A schematic way of thinking 
about it is that an agent may believe that A is F, for any ​descriptive ​property, F, while failing to 
“endorse” A in the sense that is characteristic of practical deliberation.  She may grant that A is 
natural, or what she would desire to desire, or utility-maximizing, while still wondering what to 
do (and not merely in the sense that we all can be weak in will).  But why should it matter that F 
is descriptive?  As Simon Blackburn points out, “[e]​ven if [a normative] belief were settled, there 
would still be issues of what importance to give it, what to do, and all the rest….For any fact, 
there is a question of what to do about it [1998, 70].”  In other words, could not a​n agent know 
that A is F, for any property, descriptive ​or normative​, F, while failing to “endorse” A too? 
 
We can use normative pluralism to argue that one could.  Let us ​assume ​that normative pluralism 
is true.  We can either counterfactually conditionalize on it (“had it been the case that normative 
pluralism was true…”), or imagine that it turns out to be true, in the sense that it might turn out 
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to be true that water fails to be composed of H​2​0.  (It could certainly turn out to be true!  Boyd, 
Jackson, Scanlon and others ​actually are​, by all appearances,​ ​normative pluralists.  Perhaps we 
took a class in metaethics and came away convinced of Boyd’s view, for instance.)  Then, while 
the assumption of mathematical, modal, (meta)logical, etc. pluralism ​deflates ​mathematical, 
modal, (meta)logical etc. questions, the assumption of normative pluralism does not deflate 
practical ​ones.  The question of what to do remains open even assuming normative pluralism.   6
 
Consider, for example, the question of whether every non-empty set has a Choice function.  This 
is analogous to the Parallel Postulate question under the assumption of pluralism.  There is no 
non-semantic question at stake.  But the question of whether to kill the one to save the five is not 
deflated in this way.  Granted that we ought​1​ to kill the one, ought​2​ not, and so on, for any 
ought-like notions you like, the practical question of ​whether to ​kill the one remains open.  The 
various ought-like notions “point” in different directions, leaving us with the practical question 
of which to follow.  Even if we decide to bow to the contingencies of natural language semantics 
-- “following” the property that we happen to refer to with “ought” -- this is a separate 
conclusion, not one that can be “factored out” into the normative pluriverse.  In other words, an 
omniscient semanticist could not resolve our question of whether to kill the one to save the five 
just by confirming that we mean ought​1​ by “ought” (and we ought​1​ kill the one).  In summary, 
6 ​A different formulation of the argument uses the logical law of weakening (Clarke-Doane, Forthcoming).  Suppose 
that, e.g., we ought to kill the one to save the five.  Now stipulatively introduce to ought-like concept, ought*, 
according to which we ought* not kill the one to save the five.  If knowledge that we ought to kill the one to save the 
five ​settles ​the question of whether to on its own, then it does so in tandem with knowledge that we ought* not.  But 
it does not.  So, knowledge that we ought to kill the one does not even settle the practical question on its own.  (I 
borrow the star notation from (Eklund 2017).) 
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practical questions may remain open even when the facts, ​including the normative facts​, are 
settled. 
 
Objections and Replies 
There are various ways in which one might try to resist this “New Open Question Argument”.  It 
might be objected, first, that the argument at most shows that we need to settle a question of 
metaphysics in order to, strictly speaking, settle our deliberation.  We need to settle which of 
ought​1​, ought​2​, etc. is ​metaphysically privileged​ in something like the sense of (Sider 2011). 
Properties are cheap.  When asking what we ought to do, we intend to be appealing to the 
“authoritative” (McPherson Forthcoming) or “robustly” (Werner 2017, 9) normative ones. 
When doubts are raised about our success, a further question arises.  But either the question of 
whether the referents of our normative terms are metaphysically privileged is itself normative, or 
it is not.  If it is not, then Moore’s original Open Question Argument applies.  Learning that 
ought​1​, say, is metaphysically privileged would be like learning that it is brown.  It would be 
neither here nor there from the standpoint of practical deliberation.  But if the question ​is 
normative, then the argument can just be re-run for privilege.  Even if ought​1​ is not privileged, it 
is privileged*, for some alternative privileged-like concept (properties are cheap), and the 
practical ​question remains whether to theorize with privileged or privileged* concepts (Dasgupta 
2019). 
 
A more substantial worry is that the New Open Question Argument trades on a false contrast 
(Das Forthcoming).  I said that mathematical, modal, logical, etc. pluralism deflates 
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mathematical, modal, logical, etc. questions.  But in the normative case, I said that normative 
pluralism fails to deflate ​practical ​-- what to do -- ones.  I did not say that normative pluralism 
fails to deflate normative questions ​per se​.  Indeed, it would seem to.  (This is presumably why 
debates in academic ethics, epistemology, and so on threaten to be “verbal”, just like debates in 
non-evaluative fields, like metaphysics.)  But mathematical pluralism also fails to deflate 
practical questions.  It does not tell us, e.g., what notion of set to use.  So, there is no contrast 
after all. 
 
But this objection is short-sighted.  Mathematics is theoretical while normative inquiry is 
practical.  We do not determine what we ought to do for the sake of accumulating “normative 
theorems”.  We do so to act.  But, then, the fact that knowledge of the normative facts fails to 
settle practical questions is a problem.  It does not show that normative realism is ​false​.  It shows 
that it fails to do the primary thing it should do -- i.e., tell us what to do!  On the other hand, 
nobody would suggest that mathematical facts tell us -- all by themselves -- what to do.  They do 
not even tell us what mathematical notions, or axioms to use.  This is just a simple application of 
Hume’s point that one cannot derive an “ought” from and “is”, and of Moore’s original point that 
one can know that something is F, for any ​descriptive ​property, F, while failing to “endorse” it. 
 
Might the above considerations instead show that practical deliberation is resolved by ​ineffable 
facts (Eklund 2017)?  It does not seem so.  There are two ways in which “practical propositions” 
could be ineffable.  They could be structurally ineffable in the sense of Hofweber (2017).  They 
could fail to possess sentential structure.  But, if so, then it would be impossible to explain the 
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connection between our linguistic behavior with normative sentences and the practical 
propositions to which we appeal in deliberation.  If you utter S and I reply ~S, where S is a 
normative sentence, then we should at least be able to infer that the practical propositions that we 
believe are inconsistent.  But if practical propositions are structurally ineffable, then the notion of 
consistency may not even ​apply ​to them -- since there may be no operation on them 
corresponding to sentential negation.  So, it might be thought that practical propositions are 
ineffable because, while they possess sentential structure, practical ​properties ​are ineffable.  But 
if this were why practical propositions were ineffable, then we could just reformulate pluralism 
and bypass talk of sentences.  Call ​practical pluralism​ the view that there are a plurality of 
practical-like propositions, true of different parts of the practical-like pluriverse.  (We must be 
able to ​mention ​these propositions if the ineffability thesis is coherent.)  Then, even assuming 
practical pluralism, the question of whether to kill the one to save the five seems to remain. 
 
To be sure, there is ​something ​puzzling about normative pluralism.  But this is what we would 
expect if the facts failed to settle practical questions, as alleged.  For any descriptive area, F, the 
notion of F-like properties makes sense.  We can imagine set-like properties, possibility-like 
properties, consequence-like properties, and so on.  If there are such things as normative 
properties, then why do we have trouble “tweaking” them, as we tweak the property of being a 
set?  The obvious answer is that, in ordinary language, we do not use “ought to be done” to 
express a property at all.  We use it to answer what to do questions.   ​And pluralism about what 7
7 This is exactly the moral that Blackburn draws from Moore’s argument.  He concludes, “​evaluative discussion just 
is discussion of what to do about things [1998, 70].” 
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to do may well be unintelligible​.  But this truism is no thanks to special facts that we cannot even 
assume ​to be non-objective.  It is thanks to the banal fact that we can only do one thing.  8
  
Realism and Objectivity Revisited 
I have discussed the Benacerraf problem for realism about areas like mathematics, modality, and 
logic, as well as the pluralist response to it.  I have argued that normative realism is peculiarly 
unsatisfactory.  If normative pluralism affords a resolution to the Benacerraf Problem for 
normative realism, this is only because normative facts fail to settle practical questions. 
 
On a traditional taxonomy, the conclusion of this article might be taken to show that practical 
questions are not objective.  But this would be misleading.  The conclusion shows that realism is 
false of those questions.  Practical questions are what remain when the facts, even the normative 
facts, come cheaply.  But far from undercutting the objectivity of practical inquiry, this is why its 
objectivity is robust.  If practical questions answered to the facts, then their objectivity would be 
compromised if the facts were abundant -- just like mathematical, modal, or logical questions. 
 
On the other hand, any mathematical realist is a geometrical realists as well.  But pure geometry 
fails to be objective in a key respect.  A disagreement over the Parallel Postulate can be resolved 
by stipulation: you take lines​Euclidean​ and I will take lines​hyperbolic​.  There is no non-verbal 
8 Thanks to Jennifer McDonald for suggesting this way of putting the point.  This response is especially compelling 
if (Gibbard 2003) is right that the resolving attitude is intention (assuming that we cannot intend to X and ~X, at the 
same time).  (Note that if the New Open Question Argument works, it works however one construes the facts.  For 
instance, if the normative facts are construed “constructivistically” ​a la​ (Street 2006, Sec. 7) or (Korsgaard 1996), 
then the problem becomes Enoch’s “agent/shmegent” problem.  Just as we can wonder whether to do what we 
ought1 as opposed to ought2 to do, realistically construed, we can wonder whether to be an agent or a shmagent 
(Enoch [2006]).) 
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disagreement to have about “the pure lines simpliciter”.  The Benacerraf problem invites a 
similar stance on foundational mathematics, modality, logic, and other descriptive areas for 
which the Benacerraf problem is pressing.​  It is ​as if​ conventionalism about these areas were 
true. 
 
The upshot is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which have been widely identified, do 
not merely bifurcate.  They are in tension.   
14 
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